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to prevent escheat (when the landholder was
not survived by descendants).'"
Late into the 19th century, the trust
remained primarily a branch of the law of con-
veyancing. Early treatises on trusts-such as
those by Geoffrey Gilbert (three editions from
1734 to 18n)' and Francis Sanders (five editions
from 1791 to 1844>'-are completely devoted
to land transfer and landed estates. These
books are all but untouched by the law of
fiduciary administration.
Today's trust has ceased to be a con-
veyancing device for land and has become,
instead, a management device for holding a
portfolio of financial assets.' The management
trust is a response to the radical change away
from family real estate as the dominant form
of personal wealth. As the jurist Roscoe Pound
observed in an arresting epigram, "Wealth in a
commercial age is made up largely of promis-
es."s Most modern wealth takes the form of
financial assets: equities, bonds, mutual fund
shares, insurance contracts, pension and
annuity interests, and bank accounts. Today's
trust typically holds a portfolio of these com-
plex financial assets, which are contract rights
against the issuers. Such a portfolio requires
skilled and active management. Investment
decisions must be made and monitored, the
portfolio rebalanced and proxies voted.
Unusual assets, such as close corporation or
partnership interests, commonly require even
more active and specialized administration.
By contrast, under the old conveyancing trust
that held ancestral land, the beneficiaries
commonly lived on the land and managed it.
The trustees were, in truth, more stakeholders
than managers; they were, in effect, nominees,
with no serious powers or duties.
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The transformation in the nature of wealth
that led to the management trust brought
about a parallel transformation in trusteeship.
Trustees of old were unpaid amateurs, that
is, family and community statesmen who lent
their names and honor to a conveyancing
dodge. Writing in the last years of the 19th
century, the great legal scholar Frederic W.
Maitland could still observe that "[allmost
(,
every well-to-do-man was a trustee."
Private trustees still abound, but the proto-
typical modern trustee is the fee-paid profes-
sional whose business is to enter into and
carry out trust agreements. These entities
thrive on their expertise in investment man-
agement, trust accounting, taxation, regula-
tion and fiduciary administration. Indeed, the
founding of Trusts & Estates magazine 100
years ago, to serve trust professionals and
their legal advisors, evidences the growth of
the new profession that arose to conduct trust
management. Amateurs do not need to read
professional literature,
In the days when amateur trusteeship pre-
vailed, and trustees had little to do, the rule
was settled that they should serve without
compensation (unless the settlor made special
provisions for compensation in the terms of
the trust). Sanders, the late-18th-century
English treatise writer, explained: "[Clourts of
equity look upon trusts as honorary, and as a
burden upon the honor and conscience of the
[trusteel, and not undertaken upon merce-
nary motives.'" The rise of professional trust
management made that rule untenable.
American courts and legislatures led the way
towards reversing the rule, substituting the
modern standard of reasonable compensa-
1\
tion. Today's characteristic trustee is a fee-
paid professional service provider.
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Another profound transformation that was
essential to bring about the modern manage-
ment trust was a reorientation in the way trust
law went about the task of protecting trust
beneficiaries. Because the trustee nominally
owns the trust property, the trust relationship,
by necessity, puts the beneficiaries of a trust at
the peril of trustee misbehavior; a trustee
could, for example, misappropriate or mis-
manage the trust's assets.
Protecting the beneficiary against those
dangers has always been the central concern of
trust law In the early centuries of the trust, when
The
modern
trustee
requires
extensive
discretion
to meet
changing
market
forces.
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trustees were mostly stakeholders of
ancestral land, it was relatively easy to
keep them in check, simply by dis-
abling them from doing much with the
trust property Thus, trust default law
deliberately supplied no trustee pow-
ers. The trustee had only those powers
that the trust instrument expressly
granted, which were typically few; as
the trustee's job was usually just to hold
and convey to the remainderpersons.
Stakeholder trustees did not need to
transact. Joseph Story summarized
American law in his treatise of 1836:
"[Tlhe trustee has no right (unless
express power is given) to change the
nature of the estate, as by converting
land into money, or money into land.""
Trustee disempowerment was,
therefore, the original system of ben-
eficiary safeguard in the law of trusts,
and it worked well enough as long as
trustees had nothing much to do
beyond standing as nominee owners
of family land. But when the portfolio
of financial assets displaced family
land as the characteristic form of fam-
ily wealth held in trust, disempower-
ment became quite counterproduc-
tive. The modern trustee conducts a
program of investing and managing
financial assets that requires exten-
sive discretion to respond to chang-
ing market forces.
Two great steps were needed to
adapt trust law to the rise of the man-
agement trust: Disempowerment had
to be abandoned, and a new system
of beneficiary safeguard had to
be devised.
Broad empowerment legislation,
such as the Uniform Trustees' Powers
Act (1964), is now Widespread. Such
statutes authorize trustees to engage
in every conceivable transaction that
might enhance the value of trust
assets (and professlOnally drafted
instruments commonly contain such
powers). The Uniform Trust Code
(2000) completes this development,
reversing the common law rule and
providing the trustee with "all pow-
ers over the trust property which an
54
unmarried competent owner has
over indiVidually owned property"'"
Equipping trustees with transactional
powers was only half the job of
adapting the law to the needs of the
management trust. The other half
was the development of a substitute
system of beneficiary safeguard.
Trustees with transactional powers
necessarily have the power to abuse
Enhancing the
management
powers of trustees
required the
development of
fiduciary law.
as well as to advance the interests of
beneficiaries. To prevent abuse,
trustees were subject to duties, pro-
tective in nature, which were elabo-
rated into a new body of law that we
now recognize as trust fiduciary law.
All trust fiduciary law rests on two
core principles, the care norm (the duty
of prudent administration) and the loy-
alty norm (the duty to administer the
trust for the benefit of the beneficiary).
The many subrules-for example, the
duties to keep and disclose records; to
collect, segregate, earmark and protect
trust property; to enforce and defend
claims; to be impartial among multiple
beneficiaries-are all applications of
prudence and loyalty
The modern law of trust adminis-
tration is so centered on fiduciary
law that we tend not to remember
how recently that body of law has
developed. Once again, a quick look at
the classical treatises tells the story.
Neither Gilbert nor Sanders nor Story
covers trust fiduciary law. Not until
treatises by Thomas Lewin (16 editions
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from 1837 to 1964)" in England, and
John N. Pomeroy (five editions, from
1881 to 1941)' in the United States do
we find coverage of what we now rec-
ognize as fiduciary issues, although still
in a cramped fashion, somewhat as an
afterthought. The success of mid-cen-
tury treatises by George G. Bogert and
Austin W. Scott in running Pomeroy
off the American market results from
their extensive coverage of the new
trust law; that is, of trust fiduciary law.
To be sure, principles of trust fidu-
ciary law can be traced well
back to the 18th century. Keech
1)
v. Sandford, the foundational
case on what we now general-
ize as the duty of loyalty, was
decided in 1726. The outline of
early trust investment law also
was articulated in the 18th and
early 19th centuries." But these
doctrinal impulses were not
matters of great consequence
until the last century or so.
Only when financial assets
came to displace ancestral land from
the typical trust, and when empow-
erment triumphed over disempow-
erment, did trustees come routinely
to exercise the levels of discretion
over trust property that bring the
fiduciary standards of care and loy-
alty into operation. As a practical
matter, therefore, trust fiduciary law
has been 20th-century and, now,
21st-century law.
The last great building block that was
needed to create the modern manage-
ment trust was what we might call the
deregulation or privatization of trust
investment law. When the courts first
confronted trust investment issues in
the early 18th century, they developed
a preoccupation with low-risk, low-
return investments, especially gov-
ernment bonds and well-secured
first mortgages. Legislation in
England, and in many American
states" in the 18th and 19th centuries,
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tended to prescribe a narrow range
of the so-called "legal lists."
As the capital markets developed an
ever-increasing range of investment
alternatives, the extreme conservatism
of the legal lists began to chafe. In the
United States, professional trustees led
the campaign'" to spread a more per-
missive standard for trust investment,
the duty of prudent investing, which
ultimately came to prevail in most
states. In the late 20th century, as
knowledge spread, both about the effi-
ciency of the securities markets and
about the large and costless rewards
for effective diversification, the duty of
prudent investing was revised.'" The
law absorbed the lessons of modern
portfolio theory, especially the total
portfolio standard of care, the strong
duty to diversify trust investments and
the legitimation of pooled investment
,H
vehicles. The Uniform Prudent Investor
Act of 1994, implementing these princi-
ples, is now in force in 40 states,'" and
comparable non-uniform legislation has
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been enacted in most of the rest.
The spread of the prudence norm
represents a notable endorsement of
the trust industry by the legal system.
The Uniform Prudent Investor Act says,
in its official comment: "A prudent
trustee behaves as other trustees simi-
larly situated would behave."'" The pru-
dence norm is an industry standard of
care, protecting trustees from liability if
they follow good investment practices.
The trust industry is haVing greater
trouble liVing with its responSibilities
under the duty of loyalty Professional
trustees are increasingly part of large
financial services organizations,
which rightly view trusteeship as a
profit center. The duty of loyalty has
been abridged in most states to allow
the use of trustee-affiliated mutual
funds," but trustees remain under a
fiduciary duty of loyalty not to invest
trust accounts in these in-house prod-
ucts unless doing so serves the best
interests of beneficiaries. Highly publi-
cized recent cases about improper con-
AMERICAN
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versions of common trust funds into
mutual funds are a reminder of the lia-
bility that financial services organiza-
tions face if they do not recognize and
adhere to the limitations on self-inter-
ested fiduciary behavior that trust law
continues to insist upon.
The rise of the management trust has
been accompanied by a steady trans-
formation in the sources of trust law,
from case law to statute law, often
uniform acts. This process has now
culminated in the promulgation of
the Uniform Trust Code, the first
comprehensive national codification
of the law of trusts.
Many factors have influenced the
trend towards legislation. The
American Law Institute's enormously
influential Restatements of Trusts (first,
1935; second, 1959; third, ongoing since
1992) are code-like in character. They
helped prepare the way to statute, by
articulating the principles of trust law
with great precision. Thus, the
California Trust Code, which the
drafters of the Uniform Trust Code
took as their starting point, was heavi-
ly based on the second Restatement of
Trusts. Professional trustees, especially
corporate fiduciaries whose deep
pockets put them at risk in litigation,
much prefer the precision of legislation
to the disorder of case law, and they
have been influential in promoting
much of the trust legislation.
The movement to give trust law a
legislative base also has had the effect
of making the law more uniform or
national in character. Much of the leg-
islation has been the work of the
Uniform Law Commission, an organi-
zation of the state governments. The
concern to promote uniformity among
the states in probate and trust law,
exemplified in the Uniform Probate
Code (1969, revised 1990) and the
Uniform Trust Code, responds not only
to the growth of trusts and estates hav-
ing multi-state contacts, (that is, prop-
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erty or beneficiaries in more than one
state), but also the spread of multi-state
trust companies. Thus, as the rise of
management trusts has brought about
a trust industry that is becoming ever
more national in character, trust law is
also becoming ever more national.
Wb\LTH
The central features of the manage-
ment trust are professional asset
management, conducted under fidu-
ciary safeguards, in a segregated
vehicle, which is bankruptcy-remote
from the manager. The management
trust has proven to be so attractive
and adaptable that it has spread from
its core function of family wealth
transmission to a host of other uses,
most importantly pension trusts" and
mutual funds, as well as asset securi-
tization trusts. Federal and state law
now facilitate or require a host of reg-
ulatory compliance trusts, for exam-
ple, nuclear plant decommissioning
trusts or prepaid funeral expense
trusts. The aggregate assets of these
commercial trusts now dwarf the
assets held in personal trusts by a
23
ratio of something like 20-to-1.
The attractions of the management
trust, especially its commercial uses,
have led to the absorption of the trust
in legal systems that until recent times
never knew it. Countries as remote
from the Anglo-American trust tradi-
tion as Italy'" and Japan's have been
importing the management trust.
The rise of the management trust,
the trust industry and the modern
Anglo-American law of trusts during
the last century has been an event of
historic importance, whose implica-
tions continue to unfold, as the man-
agement trust expands from its strong-
hold in Anglo-American family wealth
transmission and spreads to commer-
cial practice worldwide. I
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